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Metaphors are cognitive processes used to represent the world and better 
understand ourselves. This view, widely accepted in contemporary meta-
phor studies and confirmed by an extensive range of analysis and experi-
ments, allows to explain why metaphors have such deep impact on several 
contexts of human language and thought: they can range from syllogisms to 
poems, from newspapers headlines to adverts, from scientific models to 
thought experiments. There has been considerable study of the persuasive 
effect that metaphors have in advertisements, political speeches, arguments 
in debates, educational material, and elsewhere. While an apt metaphor can 
strengthen an argument and make it more persuasive without doing violence 
to the truth, metaphor can also, by exacerbating problems of ambiguity, 
contribute to fallacies of argumentation. The present volume collects nine 
papers which combine logical and philosophical analysis and empirical re-
search to study different aspects of metaphors in argumentation. The aim of 
this collection is to theoretically analyse the way metaphors are used in ar-
gumentation, and the linguistic and epistemological phenomena involved in 
metaphor production and comprehension in different research fields, such as 
science, literature and philosophy.  
All the collected papers were presented at the first Cagliari-Urbino 
Meeting  on  “Metaphor  and  Argumentation”,  held  at  the  Department  of  Edu-
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cation, Psychology, Philosophy of the University of Cagliari on June 13-14, 
2012. The meeting was jointly organised by the research groups Linguistica-
Mente and ALoPhiS - Applied Logic, Philosophy and History of Science 
(University of Cagliari), Synergia Research Group in Logic, Language, 
Cognition, History and Philosophy of Sciences (University of Urbino) and 
APhEx. Portale italiano di filosofia analitica (www.aphex.it). The workshop 
was divided into four sections, presenting four different perspectives on the 
role of metaphor in argumentation.  
The first section,   “The   language  of  metaphor”,   investigates   the  use  of  
metaphor as a linguistic phenomenon from a historical point of view, paying 
attention to its role in literature. After having introduced the major theories 
of metaphor from Aristotle to Relevance scholars, it focuses on live meta-
phors  in  Italian  contemporary  literature.  The  second  section,  “Epistemology  
of  metaphor”,  focuses  on  the  role  of  metaphor  in  scientific  theories  and  dis-
cusses the functions and characteristics metaphor needs in order to be a real 
tool  for  scientific  discovery  and  argumentation.  The  third  section  “Arguing  
with  metaphors”,  more  specifically   analyses   the  effects  of  metaphor   in  ar-
gumentation, from both a general perspective as in the case of the ontogene-
sis of universal and a specific perspective as in the case of quaternio 
terminorum.  The  fourth  section  “Experimenting  with  metaphors”,  proposes  
two methodologies to test metaphor comprehension in argumentation. The 
first one comes from psycholinguistics and consists in indirectly asking 
people whether and how they recognize that a conclusion follows from 
some premises containing metaphors. The second one is rooted in philoso-
phical tradition and consists in imagining radical situation and/or particular 
context where metaphors could be investigated in their deeper mechanisms. 
1. The language of metaphor 
In  “Metaphor  and  Reasoning:  Aristotle’s  View  Revisited”,  Elisabetta  Gola  
argues that all contemporary theories of metaphor claim that metaphors and 
reasoning are somehow bound. Indeed, whether emphasizing   metaphors’  
conceptual features or underlining its linguistic peculiarities, in any case 
these theories are aimed at showing that metaphor is a powerful device to 
increase our knowledge, because it enhances the connections between hu-
man thought and reality (Gola 2005). Elisabetta Gola investigates the his-
torical roots of this idea, by defining the terms of the problem in the phi-
losopher who set them first: Aristotle. Aristotle thought that metaphor is 
proper to learning and understanding, because it allows a transfer of knowl-
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edge from different domains (from a concrete domain to an abstract one), 
which are isomorphic. According to Aristotle, metaphor is a way to grasp by 
intuition the similarities we find in nature. Other conceptual procedures 
intervene to understand whether such similarities are true and metaphors are 
then grounded. 
This view on metaphor has been interrupted when classic rhetoric has 
coded metaphor and other tropes of language according to their use, classi-
fying them as language embellishments. Metaphor lost the power of con-
necting language, thought and reality until 1954, when Max Black proposed 
the interactive theory of metaphor, focusing on the role of imagination in the 
language of science. The main idea of the theory is that a metaphor involves 
at least two domains of knowledge and that the relation among them cannot 
be reduced to their single words nor to the entire domains considered as 
separated. The interaction among domains is created through a metaphor, 
which restructures the domains themselves, by (1) selecting, (2) emphasiz-
ing, (3) suppressing, and (4) organizing their traits. In 1980 George Lakoff 
and Mark Johnson proposed another view, the conceptual theory of meta-
phor, which brings back to the foreground the cognitive role of metaphor. 
Metaphors are just the linguistic surface of deeper structures, called image-
schemata, lying between propositions and images. Such image-schemata 
guarantee conceptualization through a complex system of primary and cul-
tural projections from a source domain to a target domain. Therefore meta-
phors are the litmus paper of the mechanisms of projections between do-
mains according to the context of use.  
Psycholinguists such as Raymond Gibbs (1994), Sam Glucksberg 
(2001), and Rachel Giora (2003) and others bring in front of the tribunal of 
experience the major theories of metaphor, by testing the mechanisms 
involved in metaphor comprehension to understand whether they are differ-
ent for literal and figurative meaning and whether they need different proc-
essing times. Elisabetta Gola discusses different hypotheses showing that 
there still is no shared answer to these problems in the field of metaphor 
studies. However scholars such as Deirdre Wilson and Dan Sperber, who 
proposed   the  Relevance   theory   in   1986,   show   that   there   is   a   “continuum”  
between literal language and figurative language, metaphor included, and 
that therefore the dichotomy between literal and metaphorical uses of lan-
guage is inaccurate. They are just different solutions to the same problem: 
understanding in each communicative encounter and for each exchanged 
message, which its more relevant interpretation is, i.e. the interpretation 
optimizing the costs/benefits relationship between processing effort and 
cognitive effect.  
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Their explanation of the explicit meaning challenges the traditional dis-
tinction between literal and non-literal uses of language, insofar as what is 
considered as “literal”   is   the   result   of   a   pragmatic   process   of  modulation  
(Carston 2002). Appealing  to  a  “unified  approach”  to  literal  and  non-literal 
uses of language, Robyn Carston (2002) explained metaphors as a local, on-
line pragmatic adjustment of the encoded lexical meaning resulting in an ad 
hoc concept.  However,  in  the  case  of  live  metaphors,  an  alternative,  “imagi-
native”   route   is   hypothesized   (Carston   2010;; Carston and Wearing 2011): 
the literal meaning would be maintained in a more global pragmatic process 
resulting in a range of communicated affective and imagistic effects. This 
route to understanding metaphors does not exclude the ad hoc concepts 
mechanisms, i.e. a more conceptual way to metaphor understanding. In 
Carston’s  view,   literal  meaning  plays   indeed  a   fundamental   role   for  meta-
phor understanding. However, in the case of live or literary metaphors the 
literal meaning endures in evoking an image with more important effect 
with respect to the first route.  
Giuseppe   Bomprezzi’s   paper,   “Bontempelli,   Calvino,   Montale   and  
Luzi:  Thoughts  on  Metaphor  within  Contemporary   Italian  Literature”,  spe-
cifically focuses on live metaphors taken from Italian contemporary literary 
texts. Bomprezzi outlines a theory of literature which should be able to pro-
vide an explanation to the specificities of literary texts when compared to 
other  kind  of  texts.  Quoting  Miller  (2002),  Bomprezzi  states  that  “Literature  
derails or suspend or redirects the normal referentiality of language. Lan-
guage  in  literature  is  derouted  so  that  it  refers  only  to  an  imaginary  world”  
(Miller  2002:  18).  He   focuses  his  attention  on  Roman  Jakobson’s  view  on  
poeticness, a property identified as the core characteristic of literary texts. 
However, Jakobson maintains that metaphor is the most prominent figure of 
speech in poetry, whereas metonymy is the most important scheme in prose. 
In order to  criticize  Jakobson’s  view, Bomprezzi analyses the use of meta-
phor in four Italian authors, providing two counter-examples from poetry 
and tales.  
In the tale The Good Wind (1961), Massimo Bontempelli introduces 
some figurative expressions Italians use in ordinary communicative interac-
tions. The tale presents both metaphors and metonymies as expressions we 
no longer perceive as non-literal, since they have entered our everyday lan-
guage. Only by an effort of abstraction we could get to consider them as 
figurative. Bomprezzi argues that the tale can be read as the aesthetic reali-
zation of the theory of metaphor, according to which we should hypothesize 
a plurality of worlds in order to make sense of an utterance which is not ref-
erentially coherent with the actual world. In The forest on the Superhighway 
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(1966), Italo Calvino clearly mentions the alleged wood to refer to some-
thing else: a heap of billboards. As Bomprezzi argues, this is not a metaphor 
because this case is more similar to an epistemological misinterpretation. 
The children of the tale have a model, which is in a sense a metaphor, but 
allows them to infer something true, despite its being false, with a funny ef-
fect.  
In I Have Often Met the Pain of Living (1925), Eugenio Montale does 
not  properly  use  metaphor  but  more  precisely   “objective   correlatives”,   i.e.  
denotation of specific things and/or situations, to evoke a feeling without 
necessarily  speaking  of   that   feeling  as  such.  For   instance,   the  “pain  of   liv-
ing”  is  evoked  by  “the  obstructed  brook  that  gurgles”,  “the  shrivelling  up  of  
the burnt   leaf”  and  “the  collapsed  horse”.  These   expressions   represent the 
suffering of being-in-the-world in physical terms, i.e. without referring to 
psychological states. In Under the Yoke of Metaphor (1935), Mario Luzi in-
vites the reader to consider metaphor  not  as  a  “further-ness”  or   something  
that comes after the literal or a shared background of successful communi-
cation in its turn connected to a shared world. Metaphor is rather the very 
condition of human being, to whom any object is symbolically intentioned. 
Therefore metaphor comes first, before the literal, and – as Bomprezzi sug-
gests – “the  world  is  never  the  correlate  of  an  empty  and  simple  faculty  of  
‘seeing’”. 
2. Epistemology of metaphor 
Overall the first two papers concern the language poets as well as laymen 
use to express metaphor and the theories scholars have introduced to explain 
such a complex cognitive-linguistic phenomenon. The following papers fo-
cus  on  science  as   the   special   field  where  metaphor’s  argumentative  power  
can better display its effect. 
In  “Features  and  Functions  of  Scientific  Metaphors”,  Massimo Sangoi 
aims at understanding why and under which conditions metaphor, which is 
omnipresent in scientific discourse, can really contribute to knowledge in-
creasing. As several studies have shown, metaphors are essential not only 
because of their communicative and pedagogical functions, but also (and 
more interestingly) because of their epistemic role. 
Sangoi reviews the debate on this topic to show why metaphors can 
play an essential role in theory-making. In order to understand the role and 
the heuristic effectiveness of metaphors in scientific reasoning, he outlines 
the cognitive mechanisms underpinning the effects of this figure of speech. 
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As a linguistic phenomenon, metaphor is an act of transfer of a word or 
phrase from one domain to another grounded in some similarity between the 
domains. In this transfer some properties are selected, while others are 
ignored according to some relevance criteria, which are based on the context 
and the conceptual frameworks of the domains involved. Following Lakoff 
and Johnson’s  theory  (1980),  Sangoi  highlights  the  fact  that  metaphor  is  not  
just a linguistic matter, but it rather concerns our thought and action. Meta-
phors are indeed rooted in our experience, so they are not on the same level 
of any metaphorical linguistic expression met in spoken or written speech. 
Well-known examples of conceptual metaphors are LIFE IS A JOURNEY, 
ARGUMENT IS WAR, TIME IS MOTION, SADNESS IS DOWN, etc. Their source is 
provided by Gestalten, i.e. “image-schemata”   directly   emerging from our 
bodily experience or representations of more familiar domains. Many lin-
guistic metaphors can be derived from such conceptual metaphors: for ex-
ample, sentences such as “Sam’s  life  took  an  unexpected  direction  after  he  
met  Jenny”  and  “Mary  was  at  a  crossroads,  she  did  not  know  which  way  to  
go”  are  different  manifestations of the same LIFE IS A JOURNEY conceptual 
metaphor. 
First, Sangoi considers some influential theories of metaphor, such as 
Max  Black’s   interactive view (1962) and its developments, George Lakoff 
and Mark  Johnson’s conceptual theory of metaphor (1980), and the struc-
ture mapping theory proposed by Dedre Gentner and her colleagues (1982, 
1993). This leads him to explore Indurkhya’s   interaction-based approach 
(Indurkhya 1992), with particular reference to the creative side of metaphor. 
In this framework, cognition is characterized by an interaction between a 
cognitive agent and her environment, which are equally essential to deter-
mine the structure of our conceptual system (Indurkhya 1992, 2006, 2007). 
Reassessing  Black’s  theory  on  the  mechanisms  of  projection  and  accommo-
dation, Indurkhya shows how metaphor can bring new possibilities of 
meaning into being (Indurkhya 2006). Second, Sangoi shows how different 
views about scientific theories could influence the attitude towards meta-
phor and prejudice the expectations as to its actual import in scientific rea-
soning. In this respect, pursuing the analysis in the direction suggested by 
Mary Hesse, he argues that moving from an approach focused on the syn-
tactic structure of theories (Duhem, Hempel, Popper, etc.) to those ap-
proaches that are more interested in the semantic (Suppes, Van Fraassen, 
Suppe, etc.) and cognitive (Giere, Machamer, Glennan, etc.) aspects of theo-
ries brings out the centrality of the activity of representing things or situa-
tions (based on the recognition of similarity) as an essential connection 
between metaphor, cognition and theorizing. In doing so, Sangoi takes a 
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look at several issues that have been extensively discussed in the philosophy 
of science, such as theory ladenness, underdetermination of theories by data, 
idealisation, etc. Finally, he shifts the focus on some cases of metaphor that 
seem to play a constitutive role in scientific theories. This allows him to 
show the mechanisms highlighted in the previous analysis at work in con-
crete situations. 
Valentina  Favrin  and  Pietro  Storari,  in  “The Role of Metaphor in Mary 
Hesse’s   Language   Theory”,   address Mary   Hesse’s   epistemology.   Her  
thought questioned the very idea of an ideal language supposed to perfectly 
fit a world whose ontology should reflect the hierarchical structure of Aris-
totle’s categories (Arbib and Hesse 1992). According to Logic Empiricism, 
scientific language should be the mirror of nature. According to her, scien-
tific language is instead nothing but a refinement of natural language, where 
metaphor maintains its priority over literal language, thereby allowing the 
adaptation of the discourse to a progressively extended worldview. There-
fore understanding scientific language is not reducible to the assignment of 
an external referent in the world, but rather should incorporate recognition 
of the family resemblances a linguistic community takes as more salient. 
Wittgenstein’s   notion   of   “family   resemblance”   is   indeed   used   in   Hesse’s  
theory of language to identify a set of properties belonging to different 
objects and a strategy for the selection of the relevant properties. Family 
resemblance allows considering objects as members of the same class and 
then categorizing them under the same concept. However the relation of 
similarity is not simple, being a matter of degrees and respects. So, if on the 
one hand it is quite immediate to regard certain objects, qua provided with 
specific properties, as central to a class, on the other hand any categorization 
involves some degree of vagueness, because the properties some of its 
members have set them at the periphery of the class, what sometimes makes 
the categorization itself problematic.  
By recognizing similarities and differences among objects, the process 
of categorization implies a loss of information. If we tried to restore all the  
information by making explicit the conditions whereby a category has been 
applied to certain objects, the analysis would enter into an infinite regress 
and we would never come to completely explain concepts through the re-
semblances of their properties. Going to the origin of the act of recognizing 
similarities cannot be put into words and we need to stop at a point where 
concepts cannot no longer be explained by further new concepts. At this 
primitive point we can neither rest on resemblances established beforehand, 
nor on a theory providing a strategy for the selection of relevant properties 
(Hesse 1974). A literal description of the primitive concept is then impossi-
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ble and we can only rely on exemplification. Therefore, the explanans is 
constitutively a metaphorical redescription of the explanandum.   Hesse’s  
theory of language questions the very notion of literality, as the peculiar 
characteristic of metaphor is to have a fluctuating meaning which cannot de-
scribe the world in terms of classical logic or formal semantics. 
In   “Gaia Hypothesis: The Metaphor of Planet Earth as a Living Sys-
tem”,  Sara  Matera  considers  a specific metaphor, Gaia, as metaphor of the 
Earth, wondering whether it could be considered a step to scientific theory. 
The Gaia hypothesis has been formulated by Lovelock and Margulis at the 
end of Sixties. Gaia is the name they assigned to the planet Earth considered 
as a whole as a living being. In their opinion, Gaia would have faculties and 
powers far superior to the sum of its single components (Lovelock 1979). A 
decrease in entropy in the atmosphere of the planet would have been a sign 
of the presence of life. In particular, Gaia’s   atmosphere  would   have   been  
optimally kept and settled by living beings in the surface, i.e. the biosphere. 
In spite of large-scale variations, Gaia has been able to maintain the optimal 
condition for life in the planet through a complex process of cooperation 
among all its parts: biosphere, soil, oceans and atmosphere. 
Matera is particularly interested in the relationship between Gaia and 
the mankind. The point is that, on the one hand, Man is part of Gaia, but, on 
the other hand, human activities have been provoking disastrous effects on 
her. This could seem a paradox, as if Gaia wanted to destroy herself. Ac-
cording to Lovelock, the awareness of ecological dangers and the effort in 
laws and technologies against earth destruction are just examples of auto-
regulation processes Gaia uses to hinder human lumbering presence on the 
planet. This is indeed Gaia’s  peculiarity: remaining itself despite of radical 
changes and human attempts at life survival on Earth. However, even 
though Lovelock presents Gaia as a scientific theory, many scholars have 
questioned it and argued that it can be seriously considered just an interest-
ing and illuminating metaphor, but one that is unable to shed light on the 
causality mechanisms as a real scientific theory should do (Kineman 1997, 
Gould 1997).  
Matera wonders whether Gaia is just a rhetoric tool, as literary meta-
phors usually are, or rather a scientific metaphor. She argues that, in literary 
texts, metaphors serve to evoke images, while in science they are used to 
make complex concepts easier to understand, by linking them to better-
known, everyday concepts. Gaia seems to have both these features: on the 
one hand, the name Gaia makes it look like a person and immediately 
evokes the feeling of being part of a living system; on the other hand, the 
term Gaia remembers the Greek mythological Gea, the mother Earth, and 
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makes the hypothesis easier to understand for the public. A scientific meta-
phor has indeed three functions (Bradie 1999): a rhetoric function to popu-
larize and divulge scientific theories; a heuristic function to make new dis-
coveries; and a cognitive function to offer a new explanation to phenomena 
or processes in nature. Matera argues that Gaia displays all these three 
functions and thus can be considered a scientific metaphor. What is at stake 
is rather the truthfulness and usefulness of Gaia as scientific metaphor. As 
Matera points out, a scientific metaphor should evoke meanings which are 
not theoretically misleading, even though they are useful from a practical 
point of view. However, this is precisely the reason why Gaia hypothesis 
has been criticized: its manifest finalism seems to suggest a (non-scientific) 
optimism about Gaia and the future of mankind. 
3. Arguing with metaphors  
The two following papers address the role of metaphor a) in a broader sense 
by wondering how we acquire concepts and whether they are in some way 
bound to metaphorical language and b) in a more narrow sense by analysing 
specific arguments possibly containing similes and/or metaphors, as in the 
case of quaternio terminorum. 
In  “Metaphors  and  the  Ontogenesis  of  Universals”, Vincenzo Fano and 
Tommaso Panajoli focus on the relation between metaphor and perceptual 
concepts, like colours and physical sensations, and defend a philosophical 
thesis on their ontogenesis. They aim at understanding how we come up 
with perceptual concepts and the extent to which metaphor could intervene 
in this process. The authors firstly introduce a definition of concept and con-
sider different philosophical positions on the ontogenesis of concepts. While 
the role of metaphor is now ascertained as regards abstract categorization, it 
is not so in the case of more basic levels of categorization, utterly when 
dealing with perceptual experience. Indeed, referring to a wide series of ex-
amples on abstract concepts such as love, discussion, time, and so on, 
Lakoff and Johnson (1980) have shown that the conceptual framework 
through which we understand and categorize the world is shaped by meta-
phor. However, the occurrence of transference mechanisms is confirmed by 
several studies on synaesthetic experiences (cf. Marks 1996, Cacciari 2005) 
and, based on those studies, are also confirmed the relations that psycholo-
gists and linguists have inferred between cognitive processes and figurative 
language. Synaesthesia is a particular kind of metaphor combining two or 
more sensory domains based on similarities between the data they afford, 
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whereby it establishes a connection between language and perception. 
Synaesthetic experiences are prototypical examples of embodiment, held to 
allow giving linguistic expression to the interactions happening in the sen-
sory domains. Thanks to their experiential grounding, synaesthesias act as 
linguistic passe-partouts, providing access to complex perceptual experi-
ences and effective ways of communicating them. In the light of these char-
acteristics, the authors argue that this kind of metaphor takes part in the ap-
prehension of perceptual concepts.  
When compared with perceptual properties, the process of categoriza-
tion struggle to domesticate the variety which occurs in experience. What 
seems essential in the metaphorical mechanism is the effect of prototypical-
ity. In this respect, the authors embrace an Aristotelian point of view: as 
metaphors are based on the recognition of analogies, they are likely to 
bridge the gap between the world and the words. Thus metaphors, engaging 
abductive reasoning as well as imagination and creativity, imply an  “imme-
diate   learning”.  As  Fano and Panajoli state  “the  analogical  mechanisms of 
approximation, intuitive knowledge and creative expression (metaphor) 
would therefore be the basis of the ability to abstract from experience, to 
universalize the qualities that in appearance are presented to us as disparate 
and  unrelated”.  However, following  Aristotle’s  view,  the authors argue that 
these features make metaphor more coherently placed in the field of argu-
mentation than in science. 
Claudio  Ternullo  and  Giuseppe  Sergioli,  in  “Fallacious Analogical Rea-
soning and the Metaphoric Fallacy to a Deductive Inference (MFDI)”,  are 
concerned with fallacious analogical reasoning and, in particular, the Meta-
phoric Fallacy to a Deductive Inference (MFDI), recently discussed by 
Brian Lightbody and Michael Berman (2010). The authors describe the 
structure of analogical reasoning and of fallacious analogical arguments 
and show that, in some relevant cases, the kind of fallacy involved in MFDI 
can be more properly described as a quaternio teminorum and therefore 
there is no need to introduce a new fallacy. Analogical reasoning thrives 
indeed on comparisons which are very frequent in everyday language and 
play an important role in human reasoning. A fallacious analogical argu-
ment establishes a faulty analogy as   its   conclusion.   In   the   authors’   view,  
metaphors – because of their intrinsic ambiguity – are particularly likely to 
deceive us as to correctly assess the strength of an argument, i.e. the proper 
attribution of a certain analogy as its conclusion. Quaternio terminorum 
may appear prima facie strong and formally valid, but it is actually based 
upon lexical ambiguity. 
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Quaternio terminorum, or fallacy of four terms, was coined in the con-
text of the Aristotelian syllogistic theory. The basic syllogism consists of a 
major (P1) and a minor (P2) premises and a conclusion (C) containing three 
terms: the subject, the predicate of the conclusion, and a third term (the 
middle term), which connects the subject of the first premise to the predicate 
of the second premise. Quaternio terminorum occurs when a syllogism has 
four terms rather than three, as required. The authors present the following 
example:  
 
(P1) A star is a massive luminous ball composed of plasma in 
hydrostatic equilibrium.  
(P2) George Clooney is a star.  
(C) George Clooney is a massive luminous ball composed of 
plasma in hydrostatic equilibrium. 
The reasoning involved in this argument is fallacious because of the dead 
metaphor “star”  which   is  used   in   its   literal  meaning  (celestial body) in the 
first premise and in its figurative meaning (movie celebrity) in the second 
one. 
In some arguments presented by Lightbody and Berman, the lexicaliza-
tion of metaphor is so deep that the equivocation is unavoidable. In other 
arguments, on the contrary, live metaphors are created and, therefore, falla-
cious analogical reasoning is really at work. According to Sergioli and 
Ternullo, MFDI is only at work whenever metaphors really induce a false 
analogy and that depends on the satisfaction of what they call ‘principle of 
lexicality: a metaphor is a live metaphor if and only if it is not an already 
established lexical item, or, in other words, if and only if it is not listed 
among the different meanings of a dictionary item. All metaphors satisfying 
the principle may give rise to faulty analogies. Metaphors which do not sat-
isfy it are anyway very likely to engender equivocation and, in particular, 
quaternio terminorum. Live metaphors really provide new insights on the 
relations between two different items, while dead or lexicalized metaphors 
give rise to ambiguities which invalidate the argument. Therefore fallacious 
analogical reasoning involving dead metaphors is only affected by the use of 
quaternio terminorum. 
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4. Experimenting with metaphors 
In the volume two ways of experimenting metaphors in argumentation are 
discussed. The first one tests metaphor comprehension when premises of an 
argument contain metaphorical meanings. The second one highlights the use 
of metaphor in thought experiments. The first approach is empirical and 
based on an experimental design regarding a specific kind of fallacy: 
quaternio terminorum. The second approach is properly philosophical and 
concerns thought experiments used to understand deeper mechanisms or 
structures of some phenomena.  
Francesca   Ervas   and   Antonio   Ledda,   in   “Metaphors in Quaternio 
Terminorum Comprehension”,  use  the  first  method  to  understand  the  effect  
of metaphors in arguments having the structure of a quaternio terminorum. 
As  it  has  been  shown  in  Sergioli  and  Ternullo’s  paper,  metaphor  as  middle  
term plays a fundamental role in the comprehension of the overall argument. 
Quaternio terminorum is indeed based on the intrinsic ambiguity of the 
middle term, which might have two different meanings. Ervas and Ledda 
aim at understanding how of ambiguity of meaning, as occurring in the case 
metaphor, might influence the comprehension of an argument and whether it 
could have a persuasive effect in argumentation. In their paper, they discuss 
in detail four cases of ambiguity – homonymy, polysemy, dead metaphor 
and live metaphor – in order to understand whether they actually play any 
role in quaternio terminorum comprehension. In their opinion, some prag-
matic processes such as disambiguation and modulation are required in 
identifying the meanings of the middle term in the two premises, and there-
fore their being true or false. Determining the truth or falsity of the premises 
influence the overall understanding of the argument.  
Focusing on metaphor interpretation, the authors argue that the literal 
meaning of the source domain shares some semantic properties with the 
intended, non-literal   meaning.   Following   relevance   scholars’   perspective,  
metaphor interpretation is a context-sensitive modulation process resulting 
in an  “ad  hoc”  concept  (Carston 2002, Vega Moreno 2004), especially in the 
case of dead (lexicalized) metaphors. The process of metaphor interpretation 
requires more demanding attentional resources to suppress the correspond-
ing literal meaning (Rubio Fernandez 2007), when compared to homonymy 
disambiguation, where the irrelevant meaning is suppressed by default 
(Gernsbacher and Faust 1991). Therefore the authors hypothesize that 
quaternio terminorum comprehension should mainly depend on the corre-
sponding cognitive-pragmatic process required to disambiguate the middle 
term and on the degree of shared semantic properties. 
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The norming studies of an experiment on the influence of lexical ambi-
guity and metaphor on quaternio terminorum understanding (Ervas, Gola, 
Ledda and Sergioli 2012), show that most premises containing dead meta-
phors are considered true by participants, whilst premises of arguments 
containing live metaphors are perceived as false. These results could be 
explained by the fact that participants assigned to premises containing dead 
metaphors the intuitive truth conditions they have once the pragmatic proc-
ess  of  modulation  has  produced  the  “ad  hoc”  concept.  In  a  narrow  context,  
dead metaphors are perceived as true because the encyclopaedic knowledge 
linked to the everyday use is sufficient to recognize the relevant properties 
required   for   the   “ad  hoc”  concept   construction.   In   case  of   live  metaphors,  
the premises would instead need a wider context to be properly processed to 
produce the desired imagistic effect and thus to be recognized as true. This, 
they hypothesize, is the reason why dead metaphors make the arguments 
more persuasive than others.  
Adriano  Angelucci,  in  “On  a  Few  Convergences  between  Metaphor  and  
Thought   Experiments”,   explores   another   experimental   path:   thought   ex-
periments, which are – in  the  author’s  view  – a kind of defeasible and non-
monotonic reasoning. Angelucci notes that comparing the literature on 
metaphor and on thought experiments a number of connections between 
these two domains emerge. In particular, Angelucci draws the attention on 
three aspects: 1) reductionism: the attempt to reduce the implicit cognitive 
content of metaphor and thought experiments to a literal formulation has 
proven misleading in accounting for both of them, 2) appealing to 
the tension within   the  subject’s  conceptual   system as a factor that explains 
both metaphor and thought experiments effectiveness, and 3) the resem-
blances in the way of reasoning by means of metaphor, thought experiments 
and scientific models, in that they all involve abstraction and projection. 
Furthermore, he suggests that these three concordances allow to identify 
another unnoticed epistemic function of metaphor, i.e. its effective contri-
bution to philosophical analysis. 
First, both literatures on metaphor and thought experiments present re-
ductionism as a possible approach to understanding of these phenomena. In 
the case of metaphor, the so-called substitution view of metaphor (Black 
1954) has maintained that the same cognitive effect produced by a given 
metaphor could always be produced, at least in principle, by an equivalent 
literal formulation of that metaphor. This view relies on three (false) as-
sumptions on figurative language comprehension: i) human conceptual sys-
tem is essentially literal, ii) metaphor is a deviant use of language, iii) the 
meaning and truth claims of a metaphor are just those of its literal para-
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phrase. Similarly to what happened in the case of metaphor, within the 
debate on thought experiments, the elimination thesis (Norton 1991, 1996, 
2004) claims that a thought experiment is introduced in argumentation when 
the corresponding straightforward argument would be difficult to develop, 
in order to facilitate the accomplishment of cognitive tasks. In both cases 
then, reductionism has consisted in reducing the epistemic virtues of one re-
search object to another object  supposed to subsume the first. 
Second, both cases rely on a similar cognitive mechanism specifically 
denoting the kind of reasoning involved in metaphor and thought experi-
ments, i.e. a tension between two different conceptual system in the case of 
metaphor, within a single conceptual system in the case of thought experi-
ments. In metaphor both literal and non-literal meanings are essential to 
interpretation, even though they seem to clash for some respect in a given 
context. Quoting Beardsley, “A metaphorical attribution, then, involves two 
ingredients: a semantical distinction between two levels of meaning, and a 
logical opposition at one level”  (1981 [1962]: 112). Some kind of tension is 
involved in thought experiments as well. If in the case of metaphor, the ten-
sion occurs between different levels of meaning, in the case of thought 
experiments it occurs among conflicting intuitions, namely between our cur-
rent intuitions and the intuitions coming from an imaginary scenario, whose 
consequences clash against a rival theory. As Thomas Kuhn highlighted, the 
paradox created by thought experiments is intentionally generated by its 
creator.  
Third, both the heuristic power of metaphors and thought experiments 
can be connected – in a sense – to the notion of model. The epistemic effec-
tiveness of thought experiments rests on a similarity between their func-
tioning and the functioning of scientific models: in both cases two processes 
take place one after the other: idealization and projection (mapping) from a 
domain to another. Critical thinking is needed to understand whether such a 
mapping is sound and useful. Angelucci discusses such a similarity, taking 
as  an  example  Gettier’s  scenarios,  and  concludes  that  – given the relation G 
– Gettier cases “seem to succeed in rejecting as inadequate the standard 
analysis of knowledge in that they land a strong intuitive pull to the possi-
bility  of  finding  real  world  instances  of  the  state  of  affairs  described  by  G”  
(Angelucci in this volume: 215-216).  
Finally,  Angelucci  considers  Daniel  Dennett’s  philosophy  of  mind  as  an  
example of interaction between the kind of reasoning involved in metaphor 
and a thought experiment. Not only Dennett used metaphors to express his 
own theories, but he also deeply understood the potential productiveness of 
metaphor from an epistemological point of view, as well as the inevitable 
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risks we mentioned  above.  In  particular,  Dennett’s  argumentation  starts  with  
the analysis of a specific metaphor in order to create a specific counterfac-
tual scenario. Dennett explicitly talks about “pedagogically   useful   meta-
phors”  (Dennett  1987:  22),  but  even  though not always explicitly, this is the 
way of arguing of other philosophers. And this would show that metaphor 
has proven to be useful in philosophical reasoning. 
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